The declaration from Busan (4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness - 2011) included the following four principles:
a) Ownership of
development priorities by developing countries. Partnerships for
development can only succeed if they are led by developing countries,
implementing approaches that are tailored to country‐specific
situations and needs.
b) Focus on results.
Our investments and efforts must have a lasting impact on eradicating poverty
and reducing inequality, on sustainable development, and on enhancing developing countries’ capacities, aligned
with the priorities and policies set out by the developing countries themselves.
c) Inclusive
development partnerships. Openness, trust, and mutual respect and learning
lie at the core of effective partnerships in support of development goals,
recognising the different and complementary roles of all actors.
d) Transparency and
accountability to each other. Mutual accountability and accountability to the
intended beneficiaries of our co‐operation, as well as to our
respective citizens, organisations, constituents and shareholders, is critical
to delivering results. Transparent practices form the basis for enhanced
accountability.
However, at least in the area of public financial
management, it is not clear that the donor community have actually adopted
these principles in practice. It
does appear that the old model of implementing ‘answers’ (the standard New
Public Management reforms of accrual accounting, MTEF, decentralisation etc)
with the use of international consultants on short-term projects is still the
most common approach. Donors, their
consultants and local officials in the Global South should perhaps re-consider the
extent that they have adopted the Busan principles by thinking through the
following ideas:
- Public financial management is ‘poor’ in many countries of the Global South because these countries suffered economic collapse the 1980s and the 1990s – not because they are backward and need ‘modernising’.
- PFM capacity building is not a quick fix and will probably be a decades long process.
- The point of departure for capacity building should be what already exists. This will be dependent on the intimate knowledge of local officials.
- Possible moves towards New Public Management should be open and not just promoted as ‘modernisation’. Any such moves should be based on proven approaches with clear evidence of success.
- Capacity building should be country led – not micro-managed by donors and their international consultants.
I expand on each of these ideas below.
Public financial
management is ‘poor’ in many countries of the Global South because most
countries suffered economic collapse the 1980s and the 1990s – not because they
are backward and need ‘modernising’.
Countries with a higher per capita GDP tend to do well in public
financial management and overall governance. Four countries that do
particularly well in sub-Saharan Africa are Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia and
South Africa. They far outperform other sub-Saharan countries in GDP per capita
and the quality of their public financial management systems.
Many countries in the Global South suffered economic
collapse in the 1980s with, at best, slow growth in the 1990s. This resulted in
under-paid, insecure and demoralised public sector officials, some of whom, not
surprisingly turned to corruption to survive. Getting out of this hole is much harder than falling into it,
and will take much longer, even if sustained economic growth and guaranteed
donor support over the medium term (five to ten years at least) is
provided. Many sub-Saharan Africa
economies grew well over 2003 -2008, but their economic future is now much less
certain.
What is needed is not modernisation/reform/New Public
Management, but rebuilding of public financial management processes based on
sound regulatory compliance, good quality internal financial control and
systems which are promptly brought up to date. Efficiency, performance management and decentralisation can
wait until the necessary local capacity is re-built.
PFM capacity building
is not a quick fix and will probably be a decades long process.
Donors need to learn that what public financial management
officials need is predictable support over at least the medium term (decades), not
just a few weeks or months. Whereas
most donor agencies set out ambitious matrices of reform within a time frame of
three to five years, a study of African experience with PFM reform suggests
that, in most low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa, to reach a level
where the country is capable of self-reliantly maintaining and developing its
PFM systems would take15-25 years (Andersson & Isaksen, 2002).
Public financial management reforms in New Zealand, US and
Britain have taken decades and are still continuing. So donors need to plan for and provide support over a
similar timescale. This will be
more likely to be successful if the support is dependable, predictable and
sustained over the medium term.
The point of
departure for capacity building should be what already exists. This will be dependent on the intimate
knowledge of local officials.
Public financial management reforms should be incremental
and organic – based on existing practices improved to solve specific problems
using techniques which have been proved to be successful in a similar
environment. It is only the local
public financial management officials that really understand their systems;
international consultants fresh off the plane, whatever their CVs say, can
never have the detailed knowledge of the local context, culture and history
that is essential to lead future reforms.
A strategy of experience
sharing and peer assistance should be adopted where by the leading
countries in a given region may support other countries to raise the level and
quality of their public financial management systems based on approaches and techniques
which have clearly proved their worth in a similar environment.
But donor strategies often remain wedded to the introduction
of MTEF, IFMIS, programme budgeting, accrual accounting, performance management
etc etc. They are pushing NPM
style, fundamental reforms with international consultants when these are not
clearly based on the actual experience of success.
Possible moves
towards New Public Management should be open and not just promoted as
‘modernisation’. Any such moves
should be based on proven approaches with clear evidence of success.
‘Reinventing Government’ by Gaebler and Osborne in 1992
applied to the public sector the supposed power of performance measurement and
launched a new industry of performance indicators and targets. This is part of the NPM agenda of
‘modernisation’, ‘efficiency’ etc.
However, by the mid-1990s doubts had risen about the transferability of
PFM models from more developed to less developed countries. The New Public Management model, for
instance, failed to get the expected traction in countries such as Jamaica. The
New Zealand accrual accounting model was sold to countries that had difficulty
in managing their resources on a cash basis, including Mongolia, with poor
results. Schick (1997, 1998) advocated a step-by-step approach, starting with
getting the ‘basics’ right.
But this was then ignored by donors who, for example, continued
insisting on moves towards accrual accounting, programme budgeting and performance
audit. This was despite the lack of clear objective research that these
approaches really deliver their expected benefits in the industrial countries,
let alone across the Global South.
Many so called ‘modern’ techniques are part of a specific
approach to public financial management reform. The decision on whether or not to take this route should be
openly discussed by local officials and politicians, and guided by the actual
level of success of similar reforms in other countries.
Capacity building
should be country led – not micro-managed by donors and their international consultants.
Consultant led development projects are rarely sustainable
or successful and breed dependence rather than real capacity development.
Analysis of the risks to development and the reduction in risk that could be
achieved, within the constraints of government will and government capacity to
absorb reforms can only be undertaken by local officials who have the necessary
deep understanding of how their systems actually work.